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Article 7

Book Reviews
Phoenix II: Uncollected, Unpublished, and Other Prose Works by D. H.
Lawrence, edited by Warren Roberts and Harry T. Moore. New York:
Viking Press, 1968. Pp. 640. $12.50.
One of the dividends deriving from the D. H. Lawrence boom of the 1950'5
and 60's has been its having encouraged publishers and editors to make ail of
his writings, major or minor, conveniently accessible. Thus in 1962 appeared
two volumes of the letters, in 1964, Tbe Complete Poems, and in 1965 The Com~
plete Plays. And now appears this fat and handsome 640 page volume of
sketches, stories, essays, translations, book reviews and what not. The overall idea
of compiling Phoenix II was an admirable one, and commendations, despite the
acrimonious notc which is supposed to be struck when greeting publications
devoted to Lawrence, are certainly in order here.
In an essay on The Rainbow Herbert Lindenberger makes the point that it
is difficult to approach anyone of Lawrence's works (except the tales) "as an
independent, self-sustained entity in the way we can, say, Madame Bovary or
Tom Jones: even a work like Women in Love would give the reader who is
unfamiliar with anything else by or about Lawrence little sense of its meaning
or stature. One could speak of a sort of overflow principle in his work (' overflow' was what Wordsworth called those passages which he could not accommodate in his poems) whereby the interests . . . and mannerisms of one novel
flow •.. into the travel books, poems, letters, and essays."'" More than thirty
years ago an awareness of the value of these" overflow 11 writings led Edward D.
McDonald to compile his collection of Lawrence's posthumous papers, Phoenix
(1936), a complilation that has become an indispensable desk-book. Anyone
engaged in the difficult task of trying to understand The Rainbow, for example,
will be obliged to McDonald for having made available the "Study of Thomas
Hardy" which Lawrence wrote at the time he was planning his novel. In recent
years, however, copies of the original Pboenix have become expensive and hard
to come by, and it was a good idea to reissue it, with only a slight change of title
(Pboenix 1, price $12.50), its reappearance coinciding with the publication of this
second collection, Phoenix II.
As for unpublished materials in Pboenix II, the pickings, after thirty years,
were inevitably thinner. About a third of Pboenix I was taken up with items
never previously published; only 47 pages of Pboenix II are of tIlls category.
What Messrs. Roberts and Moore have sought out, instead, are collections Of
single items that have become generally inaccessible. Thus they reprint the
entire collection, Reflections on tbe Deatb of a Porcupine (1925) which includes
that key essay for an understanding of personal relations in Lawrence's fiction,
The Crown. Also reprinted in full is Assorted Articles (1930). From A Modern
• "Lawrence and the Romantic Tradition 11 in A D. H. Lawrence Miscellany,
ed. H. T. Moore, Carbondale, Illinois, 1959, pp. 339-40.
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Lovet (1934) they reprint Mr. Noo1l, but for some odd reason omit the other
six stories in that volume. Despite some lively sections, Mr. Noon, as I have

!

argued el~ewhere, is perhaps the worst story Lawrence ever published. For
compensatIOn, however, we have here the masterful sketch of Maurice Magnus
which Lawrence himself once described as his finest piece of writing. To have
this work available again between hard covers is almost enough in itself to
justify the price of the whole volume.
Among the unpublished pieces, perhaps the most interesting is an autobiographical account of Lawrence's return to Eastwood where he has a confrontation
with his mother's "bourgeois" spirit. This valuable item was obtained from a
manuscript in the University of Cincinnati collection which previous editors
had vainly tried to secure for publication. Also of interest are t\Vo early accounts
of Lawrence's school-teaching which can provide interesting comparisons for the
scenes of Ursula's classroom experiences in Tbe Rainbow.
In addition to the unpublished pieces there are several uncollected items which
will be new to many readers. Two short stories, in this category, are of special
interest, The Mortal Coil, an impressive story in its own right, and The Thimble
which presents an early version of a situation Lawrence was to explore in variety
of ways in later stories and novels. In this 1917 version, a wounded English
officer returns from the front to his high-strung wife in London. Because of his
having almost died, he has a new perspective on their relationship; despite his
disfigurement (his jaw has been shot away) he talks now of resurrection through
love. As the editors remark, The Thimble was later "rewritten n as The Ladybird, but one should note that it was alsQ "rewritten" as The Man WhO' Died
and as Lady Chatterley's Lover. If the wounding is a smashed jaw instead of
smashed genitals, the man who almost died may win his way back to life and
bring the woman through with him. In the other situation, where the husband
is literally or figuratively maimed, deliverance is delegated to the dark outsider,
Count Psanek in the story or Mellors in the novel. The Blind Man too, although
at a greater remove, provides another variation on the basic situation set up in
this short short story.
Also of special interest in the category of relatively unknown pieces is an
opening chapter Lawrence wrote for Women in Love, entitled Prologue, which
he later discarded. It is fascinating to see how Lawrence originally planned to
open his book as well as close it with the focus not on the sisters but on
the two men, Birkin and Gerald, and especially how he boldly explores the
problem of Birkin's preference for physical contact with the male body rather
than the female. Because it was my good fortune to have stumbled on this
opening chapter in the vast Texas collection and to have edited it with' a critical
introduction (Texas Quarterly, Spring, 1963) my recommending it as one of the
most important items in Phoenix II may be written off as mere parental partiality,
but I do not think I am exaggerating its importance for an understanding of
Lawrence's greatest novel. To have the chapter between hard covers is also
welcome.
The enthusiasm with which I have been speaking of tIlls smorgasbord collection
may sound like Mr. Chadband after a feast (H 0 let us be joyful! "), but one
reservation needs to be aired. Messrs. Roberts and Moore have elected to
organize the sixty-one pieces in the collection into seven sections under headings
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such as "Stories and Skcrchcs,11 "Essays," and then of volumes previously collected such as Assorted Articles. The task of grouping pieces that relate to each
other is thus left to the reader or to future editors. Because so many of Lawrence's
pieces are mixtures of essay, autobiography, and fiction, it would have been
difficult to try to sort out these sixty-one pieces and to impose some more cogent
form of order, as McDonald tried to do in the original Phoenix, but despite the
difficulty it is a tasld worth considering. We could then have a section of Autobiography, another of literary criticism (including reviews), a section of what
Lawrence called his poly-analytics, and perhaps what McDonald categorized as
"Peoples, Countries, and Races." Some of the liveliest pieces in Phoenix II are
of this variety including a hitherto unpublished sketch of Gennan tourists in
Florence. Under this head would be included his critical reports on England
and the English; Lawrence's intense sense of claustrophobia on his return from
America to his densely-populated island is impressively rendered as is also his
awareness of declining prestige and self-respect in his fellow-countrymen. One
wonders how Dr. Leavis would react to Lawrence's hitherto unpublished observation:
England's prestige has declined terribly, all over the world. Ah, says the
Englishman, that's because America has the dollars. And there you hear
the voice of England's own downfall. England's prestige wasn't based on
money. It was based on the imagination of men. . . • These poor
'superior' gentry, all that is left to them is to blame the Americans. It
amazes me, the rancour with which English people speak of Americans.
. . • After all, rancour is a bad sign in a superior person. It is a sign of
impotence. (256)
Against this observation, however, it is interesting to set the following Apocalyptic prophecy about America delivered in 1922:
To the vast white America, either in our generation or in the time of our
children or grandchildren, will come some fearful convulsion. Some
terrible convulsion will take place among the millions of this country,
sooner or later.
Unless this dire prophecy materializes, it would seem then that there remains
a task for a later generation of Lawrentian editors-perhaps of the Establishment
variety at present engaged in editing Emerson. "What will finally be called for,
1 suggest, will be some bold groupings that would take in writings from allover
the Lawrence map, from Phoenix I as well as Phoenix II and elsewhere so that
we could have a volume of literary criticism, a volume of autobiography, a big
volume of travel sketches and others.
And to speak of literary criticism, there is in this collection a talk given by
Lawrence when he was a young schoolteacher entitled Art and the Individual
which can serve as a useful lead-in to all of his writings. The talle is, as the
editors say, "amateurish," but what is revealing is to compare it with the early
literary papers of his young rival, James Joyce, delivered during approximately
the same period. Joyce, despite the abundant humanity of his stories and
novels, was committed to an aesthetic theory of detachment. Lawrence, from the
beginning, is committed, like George Eliot, to the principle of what he calls
"sympathy." And working through these almost 700 pages of U overflow," a
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reader gains a reinforced sense of how this commitment contributes to Lawrence's

distinctive qualities as an artist. The streak of vulgarity and nastiness of the
man and writer are present at times in the present collection-a streak that
Lawrence. hoped his editor and readers would deplore rather than applaud-but
to offset It, and to offset it overwhelmingly, is the vitality that makes every
page of even the most ephemeral of his newspaper items sparkle with energy
so that even expressions of disgust have zest. "The immediate goal of education
is to gain a wide sympathy"-said the young schoolteacher to his study group
sixty years ago, and this volume, whether Lawrence is celebrating a tortoise'
stretching out its neck as a classroom exhibit, or German infantrymen on a
pre-dawn route march, or the greamess of Flaubert as compared with the
" corruscations" and soul-twistings of Dostoevsky, is once more a reminder of
how lucky we have been to have had him write in our century, and, on a much
less exalted level, lucky too that he has engaged the attention and labors of
competent and dedicated editors who have made the stream of this vitality more
accessible to us.
GEORGE H. FORD
University of Rochester

Forms of Discovery: Critical and Historical Essays on the Forms of the Short
Poem in English by Yvor Winters. Denver: Alan Swallow, 1967. Pp. xxii
377. $8.95.

+

A reading of Forms of DiscO'lJery under the shadow of Yvor Winters' death
confirms one's sense of how wrong Winters was in his belief that the person dies,
although the work of art, if great poetry, lives on. For Winters'lives as a person,
not only in his poems, but also in his criticism. The heritage left us, by the
great critics of the passing generation, is a rich one, as three works published
in 1967, R. P. Blackmur's Primer of Ignorance and Kenneth Burke's Language lIS
Symbolic Action, in addition to Winters' book, clearly manifest. These three
books represent distinct tendencies of the criticism we inherit, and in forms so
pure as to convince everyone of the integrity and forcefulness of their authors.
Burke has moved increasingly toward an impersonal, technical, methodical
eriticism; if it were not for the fine photograph of Burke lecturing on the jacket
of the book and the two essays written on his friends, Williams and Roethke,
one might forget that a person had written the book; surely there is no chance
to Burke this logological machine, to uncover its scatological underpinnings.
Blackmur, in contrast, is more personal than ever. On so abstract a subject as
the American Character, he elicits extraordinary profundities out of his
personal attendance at performances of various ballet troupes. American and
European. Winters' hook lies between these two: it has an impersonal, rational
surface, with its attention to abstract themes and technical craftsmanship; at the
same time, few books of criticism are richer with the intimate pulsings and
passions and sensitivity of their author. There is no need, at this late time, to
berate the critic for his limitations or to expose his flaws to his unwary
followers. I wish rather to show, within the limits of my own insight, how the
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various aspects of this book articulate and memorialize, in living form, the
personal character of this 'great eccentric" of our time.
One could, of course, attack Winters at the level of thought. He was taken
by Aquinas at the very point where Aquinas was closest to the heresy of
Averroes, with the claim that form is universal and matter individual, so that a
mind thinking correctly becomes indistinguishable from Mind itself. Such an
idea, which Aquinas tempered, but inconsistently, explains the need that led to
the Searist doctrine of haecceitas, based as it is on the concept of form as
individual. One may marvel, indeed, at the blundering way in which Winters
condemns Hopkins for deviating from <I orthodox Catholic doctrine." Winters
knows Hopkins is Scotist and the orthodoxy from which he says he -deviates is
the heretical taint in Aquinas that, had it been developed consistently, as it was
by Averroes, would have destroyed the conception of personal immortality
(See The Function of Criticism, p. 143). Of course, Winters himself had no
faith in such immortality. Besides, ,:vhat makes criticism at this level inadequate
is that this thought of Winters (" If we were all perfect, we should all be
precisely alike, for in matters of the mind there is only one perfection.") is much
more than a thought; it is a deep-seated impulse, a coagulation of the, whole man
around a central, felt idea.
Winters believes that criticism is judgment and that, to the extent that it is
of value, such judgment is universal, is free of any taint of the personal or
individual. No critical judgments, however, are more personal, more forthrightly
and passionately distinctive, than those he himself makes. The fount of Winters'
character, as man, critic, and poet, is his decision to repudiate all that is personal
and individual, to flush down the drain all feelings that grow out of an intimate
personal relationship. The most painful aspect of human life is the contradiction
between the infinite, absolute value of an individual human being like Cordelia
and the fact that, in her mortality, she seems of no more worth than" a dog,
a horse, a rat." Lear, that gruff old bear of a man, died affirming both sides
of the contradiction; Winters, at the expense of his "being and intelligence,"
decided rationally to affirm only the second. He realizes this affirmation
poetically in "At the San Francisco Airport: To My Daughter, 1954." Here he
accepts sternly, even tragically, the break in his relationship with his daughter,
the terminatio'n of her importance for him and his for her. His triumph over
personal anguish in this poem is one of the terrible moments in modern poetry:
This is the terminal, the break.
Beyond this point, on lines of air,
You take the way that you must take;
And I remain in light and stareIn light, and nothing else, awake.
Granted that in so mobile a society as ours, with us dying daily to others and
they to us, simply by departure, this stern choice seems sane. But, somehow, with
Blackmur's shadow close, one thinks such sanity looks wild beside the mad
contradiction of Lear. In any case, I think it is this severe decision, realized
poetically in this one poem, but no doubt in other forms before, that explains
the personal eccentricities of Winters' criticism.
The force, indeed, of the last words in this last book of the dying man is
poignantly personal:
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The best poets have the best minds; ultimately they are the standard.
When the time comes, my distinguished reader, his favorite poets, his
favorite subjects, and all of the members of his eUte group will have
turned to dust. (360)
Furthermore, the abandonment of personal love on the grounds that individuals
are mortal and that it is irrational to evade deciding betWeen the nullity ·or
infinite value of an individual is the basis of much of what he presents as most
rational. II Death is absolute and without memorial." Winters values in Stevens
only those poems which affirm" the situation of the isolated man in a meaningless universe." (277) He says: "I do not object to Stevens' refusing to offer any
consolation to the reader; I myself can offer none." All the poems in which
Stevens affirms the intimate value of persons for each other by means of the
Supreme Fiction, Winters abruptly drops from the canon as faulty because
based upon a foolish notion of the Imagination. All poetry, in truth, which
combines the individual and the universal, which finds value in the lmique
person, is, for one specified reason or another, rejected as inferior. All romantic
poetry, of course, is corruptive and must be rooted out of our systems. More
curiously, the sonnets of Shakespeare's which he chooses to condemn are mainly
those which articulate the poet's sense of the limitless value of an individual
human being. The cost of writing a poem like" At the San Francisco Airport J7
is extreme.· To focus his whole sense of life in so fine an art object accompanies,
if it does not cause, an incapacity for the free, imaginative, critical play of mind
necessary to respond to most great Renaissance and romantic poetry, certainly
to that of Sidney, Spenser, and Shakespeare. One wishes Winters could have
encountered so ruthless and cold and great a poet as Pet.rarch, who refused, just
as decisivdy as Winters but in opposition to a medieval stance like his, to
abandon his sense of the infinite value of the individuals whom he loved. Of
course, it must be admitted that the critical freedom needed td respond to both
Winters and Petrarch probably bars one from writing a poem comparable to
those of either.
Many brilliant incidental comments by Winters support the notion I am
suggesting. Of Donne's "Canonization," he says: "I am not interested in the
petulant conversation of Donne or of any other man." (76) Of the "Epistle
to Arbuthnot," he says that nothing holds it together
except Pope's exasperation with people who have exasperated him.
They were doubtless exasperating, but so are most people; so is life. (126)
More important, his astounding reduction of rhythm to meter must, I think, be
traced to his decision to find nothing personal in great poetry. For rhythm is
the vital bodying forth of the personal nature of the poet, as he articulates his
unique sense of the world. One may grant that in some great poems rhythm is
close to meter, and that this is true especially in poems of withdrawal, like
U At the San Francisco Airport," in which a tight-lipped, steel-toothed assertion
of impersonal endurance is being made. But in most great poetry, rhythm negates
meter, plays off it, surrounds it, moves innumerably and qualitatively as the
personal feeling of the poet. All such poetry Winters rejects as u·dramatic."
Finally, it is clear to me that Winters' irrational refusal to recognize a
difference between Cleanth Brooks' exegeses and his own paraphrases stems
from his disbelief that personal quality can be immortalized in poetry. For
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Brooks speaks of individual lines of a poem only in relation to the dramatic
totality of the poem, only in relation to the intimate, supra-logical, personal
action of the whole poem; whereas the whole of a poem for Winters is at most
a theme stated objectively, and he usually interprets lines for what they mean in
themselves. He is repeatedly referring to great lines, just as he exclaims over a
"brilliant meter," or even a "brilliant spondee."
Forms of Discovery is, in sum, a forcefully personal book. One is not apt to
laugh too hard or long at Winters' laughter at Yeats for comparing Maude
Gonne, mere Maude Gonne, to Helen of Troy. Winters accepts the air terminal,
where" The metal glitters, deep and bright." Surely, he does it with a sense
of loss and a sense of the tragic implications of this acceptance for which one
looks in vain in the technological agility of Kenneth Burke. As for Blackmur,
can one honestly wish that he had not lived in California; can one deny that
his personal acuteness and intimacy of style, though in harmony with that
Italy which is dying to make room for the new, internationalized Italy, were
more than a blown and broken rose, pathetic beside the great planes waiting
in the yard? Winters was disgusted that scientists should know what they are
doing, but professors of literature know nothing of themselves. Winters knew
what he was doing. Fortunately for us, he was doing much more than he knew.

MERLE E.

BROWN

University of Iowa

The Edge of the Image: Marianne l11.oore, William Carlos Williams, and Some
Other Poets by A. Kingsley Weatherhead. Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 251. $6.95.

An Approach to (( Paterson" by Walter Scott Peterson. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1967. Pp. xiii, 217. $6.00.
It is quite proper that William Carlos Williams has become the central figure
for measuring our present avant-grade. Like all father-figures, of course, he must
eventually be put down. But first the dimensions of his patronage must be
thoroughly gauged. These two books arc among the latest to attempt the
unlocking of Williams' vaunted simplicity and the implications of what Hillis
Miller has called the "new immedicacy," his "poetry of reality." Professor
Weatherhead's The Edge of tbe Image centers upon Williams by placing him
in the context of his contemporaries, especially Marianne Moore, and his
Imagist predecessors on the one hand, and on the other in relation to his
Objectivist, Projectivist, and Beat heirs. Mr. Peterson's is an exercise in a special
kind of exegesis of Paterson, which takes Williams not on his own tenTIS but
as a modern Romantic visionary with one foot awkwardly stuck in the II filthy
Passaic." Weatherhead's study is by all odds the more important, and in many
ways may stand as a fundamental introduction to the putative Williams
"School." For all its occasionally uneven focus, and despite some questionable
philosophical assumptions, it is both sensitive and critical, lucid and speculative.
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H what follows seems like a basic quarrel with one of Weatherhead's positions,
it should be read in the context of a larger agreement.
The Edge of the Image theoretically focuses very intensely upon its title.
The poetry it is concerned with is, broadly intexpreted, a poetry which retains
the fidelity of objective imagery. This poetry, primarily that of Marianne Moore
and Williams, "represent(s) objects and scenes clearly and preserve(s) the
hard contours of these representations against the kind of blurring and softening
that they suffer in other kinds of poetry." If the teno "represents" were not
so deliberately employed here and elsewhere, one might accuse Professor
Weatherhead of casnally ignoring a crucial distinction of modern poetry, beginning with Pound's early formulations that the Image "presents" and does not
"represent," hence that the essential quality of the "image" is not its visual
quality. Pound, of course, distinguished the Image from imagery, and Weather~
head's interest is apparently with the latter. Weatherhead is trying to define the
right side of a spectrum of poetic style that moves from the subjective (romantic
U blurring and softening" effects) to the objective (defined images representing
a concrete world)-from, as he unfortunately chooses to call them, a poetry of
imagination to a poetry of fancy. Perhaps the most questionable thing about the
hook is this reliance on Coleridgean terms, themselves derived from associational
psychology, which are in rum interpreted in the light of I. A. Richards'
psychologizing of the Coleridgean imagination. In other words, Weatherhead
leaves himself with the nearly impossible philosophical problem of defining at
just what point the synthesizing (and blurring) effect of imagiuation, which
subordinates all objects to the central subjective meaning or theme, gives way to
objectivity or fancy's arrangement of things-as-they-are into patterns which
manifest first the thing, then the new context, and last of all any meaning the
things in arrangement might have as they consort in the flow of the poem.
Presumably, a poetry of fancy effaces the person of the maker-but of
course it cannot. And Weatherhead does not concern himself with the motty
problem of the difference between things and language, and thus the ontological
question of the reality of images, hard or soft. For all his fudging of terms,
Weatherhead only ends up by asserting that fancy "represents" objectivity
because it does not subordinate individual images to theme, and imagination
represents some subjective or abstract theme or unity or meaning which at
once precedes the images and transcends them. The point is, a psychological
explanation of subjectivity and objectivity in poetic language can only end, as
Weatherhead's does, by offering an elastic measure for distinguishing images by
texture and arbitrary points at which the one flows into the other-as witness
his attempt to place Wallace Stevens' imagination on the edge of, if not
satisfactorily within, the realm of fancy. With a metaphysical (either epistemological or ontological) as opposed to psychological (in that it attributes the
kind of image to a thematic cause) perspective, he could have first defined
Stevens' imagination in its secular (and non-mystical) limitations, and then related
its imagistic products to the phenomenology of modern subjectivity. Moreover,
Weatherhead is forced to speak of images as edge.d or as concrete, transparent
tropes, presuming a common otherness as the first cause of a poetry of fancy;
while a unique subjectivity is the first cause of poems of imagination.
All of this is to say, however, that Weatherhead tries to do with psychological
distinctions what critics like Merleau-Ponty, Georges Poulet, and more recently
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Hillis Miller have done with less arbitrariness by looking at subjectivity not as
dualistic but as of a piece, and thus looking at objectivity and reality in poetry
in terms of an ontological theory of language. For when Weatherhead is
analyzing images in themselves, or as they function in the flow of the poem, and
especially when he is examining the achievement of Williams, he is acutely aware
of the unified role and the unifying function of the subject (call it imagination
Of fancy) in any creative process. He knows that the subject is the constitutive
agent of images. And he is thus aware that to categorize the product, the image,
as fanciful or imaginative, is in large part irrelevant to that other important
assumption of concrete or objectivist poetics, from Imagism to Objectism: that
what is important about the II edge of the image" is that it reveals to us the
stance of the self vis-a.-vis its world, the reality it constitutes and not the reality
it re-presents.
Yet, after all his concern about the" clarity)) and" concreteness" of the image,
about its sensuous directness, about the distinction between imagination and fancy
-even while still defending his basic distinction, when Weatherhead comes to
examine the work of Williams especially he notes that the image" presents," and
what it presents is not only things but things-as-experienced. The objectivity of
the image includes the immediate presence of a subjectivity, as truly as Sartre
describes language in his existential phenomenology. If the image presents red
wheelbarrows and white chickens in relation, it also presents the relation, not a
representation of some external picture but a verbal arrangement which includes
the intentional act of the poet as seer and maker: "so much depends."
Weatherhead's long essay on Williams is important precisely because it seems
to abandon in mid-course the arbitrariness of its early insistence on fancy and
turns more to the kind of analysis which considers the poetic process and the
poetic product to be coterminous, continuous, and incomplete. It thus ac1mowledges that the "edges" of the images are a part of the world outside the self !iii
taken over into a new (subjective) context and reconsituted. The poem manifests
the being of the world by presenting the act of a self being-in-the-world. At this
point, the degree of subjectivity (whether deep an~ hence imaginative, or superficial and hence fanciful) is significant only in terms of the value placed upon
the role of ego and traditional assumptions about the existence of self. Weatherhead's poetry of fancy indicates an existential self, acknowledging as does Charles
Olson's essay on "Projective Verse" the significant and undeceiving role of the
earth-bound consciousness in its milieu: "Objectism is the getting rid of the
lyrical interference of the individual as ego, of the 'subject' and his soul, that
peculiar presumption by which western man has interposed himself between
what he is as a creature of nature ... and those other creatures of nature ... .'J
Of course, there is no ultimate getting rid of the "individual as ego," except
in the sense of defining the self totally within nature and the naturalness of
consciousness; nor did Williams agree exactly with Olson. But in denying the
basic dualism of self and world, Williams at least theoretically obviated the use
of psychological explanations of the poetic process implied in distinctions like
imagination and fancy. These he knew to be tied originally to a Romantic or
Transcendentalist metaphysics no longer convincingly available to the poet.
Imagination was for him the energy, and thus the evidence, of the self existing
when and where it had made an impression upon its "local." And when
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Weatherhead comes to treat this fact as it is manifest in Williams' style,
especially in the later poetry, he is on target: "in Williams, the poetic act often
consists in arranging the world around the self." This is an imaginative act
in Williams' terms-seeing the world as it is, that is with people in it; seeing
history as the language it is, the language of man's contact with, and thus his
action within, nature.
If Peterson's book seems to have got lost in this discussion, it is because
its assumptions seem so problematic in the light of recent Williams criticism.
Considered by its genre, an Honors Thesis at Yale, it is no mean achievement:
written with cogency, maturity, and an admirable enthusiasm. It also displays a
broad grasp of modem poetry and a gratifying commitment to criticism. But it is
hardly true to Williams. Though written in part under the aegis of one of
Williams' best commentators, Louis Martz, its flair of enthusiasm reflects more
of another adviser, Harold Bloom, as does its attempt to argue for 'Villiams as a
modern Blake whose major poem is full of marginally occult symbols and archetypes. Peterson calls Paterson a "Romantic epic," a "sermon" which celebrates
"traditional ideas of Christian love" throughout, and in sum a kind of modern
visionary poem. This forces a reading which, though it often produces incisive
comments on individual lines and passages, ignores Williams' warnings against
symbol and metaphor, and what they imply, as well as his w2rning against the
source of poetry's earth-bound transformations. In the former case, it is better to
trust the poem, and even the poet. For as Weatherhead points out, if one
brief instance will suffice, one can account for Williams' use of metaphor and
symbol only after he has accounted for the way the objective fact (the image
with its edges) gets into his poem. The poem yields a metaphoric and symbolic
world to its protagonist only after Paterson, N. J., its history, its pace, its
texture, its continuing presence had become a part of Dr. Williams and he
(including that part of his consciousness anterior to Paterson) of them, until
the marriage in a new context emerged, in which the two were inseparable and
thus spoke a language of their continuing, inseparable relation. It is an epic
in a more primitive sense than the Romantic epic could bej and a quest in the
very post-romatic sense of a quest made in the knowledge that there is no end,
no fulfillment, but only the recurring act.
Weatherhead offers what seems to me an essential observation about Williams'
poem~, from first to last: that they are characterized by a deliberate incompleteness which the author's stance within the world condemned him to. Incompleteness is the crucial formal element, not a flaw; the poem, as Williams
repeatedly said, is "words at flow." Its purpose is to discover, ·which docs not
imply a thing discovered so much as it points to discovery as the process of
discovery. HHe leaves the poem," says Weatherhead about Paterson, "not a
rounded whole but incomplete, straining outward toward a wider encompassing
and more comprehensive completion." Thus the poem" imitates" (it is WjJ1iams'
word. opposed to "copy" or represent) nature's incompleteness, her generative
vitality, and also man's since he is a part of her and an actor in hrr. Peterson, as
one would suspect, bases his theory of the poem's unity (its epical wholeness, its
ability to absorb the random and contingent) on its imitating nature's cycle-but
he puts a non-Williams stress on this cycle as bemg complete in itself, and thus
capable of rendering enduring archetypes and symbols. The history of poetry
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has certainJy given us this kind of nature (or Nature), but only because it has
given us men who have seen nB.turc this way. Williams did not.
JOSEPH

N.

RIDDEr..

State University of N ew York
at Buffalo

On Modernism: The Prospects for Literature and Freedom by Louis Kampf.
Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1967. Pp. viii + 338. $lO.oo.
The brave new world that Mr. Kampf heralds as "a condition of permanent
revolution" is one that serious writers have been living in for so long, that
the only truly II modem" element in this book is ¢e naive self-image projected
by its author. Mr. Kampf dramatizes himself as a representative of the tortured,
confused modem Ego, searching not for certainty, but for a way to live with
uncertainty, piercing to the social and moral corc of artistic conventions in all
times and all media:
Being modem, and naturally diseased, I cannot leave well enough alone;
being an intellectual with some pride, I assume you will be only too

happy to take the plunge with me.

,

For those who take the plunge, and manage to remain immersed in the soggy
element of Mr. Kampf's prose, there are precious few prospects, either for

literature or for freedom.
In the first chapter the reader is told that "people in the past" had "few
problems" about the "appropriate reactions" to the "classical literary formsepic, lyric, tragedy, and so forth." Then came the eighteenth century which
brought" the disintegration of any firm notion of artistic form." We have now
lost forever that golden age of art, when every situation had its appropriate
form eliciting its appropriate and unquestioned response. These forms, if we
are now to use them, must be shaped II to the exigencies of our own notions
about reality. This might give them life." The resnIt of this activity will be
"a condition of permanent revolution, that is to say, the condition of modem..
ism." The reader also learns that a critic can use any edition or translation
lying about. He may borrow useful quotations from Cassirer, or other writers
who have been over the ground before, without any need to consult the original;
he may even quote from writers without identifying the text or edition used.
Such quibbles, however, are dismissed in advance: "The hours one spends in a

library should bear better fruit than a foomote."
H the reader does sample some of the strange ftuit on Mr. Kampf's tree of
knowledge, he is not likely to end up mowing much more about "modernism"
or about "literature" than he mew before. The author blithely
most elementary cliches of period, form and style, sets them up
then demolishes them with the II high degree of epistemologicaJ.
ness" which has become II an unavoidable part of our intellectual

takes over the
as straw men,
self-consciouslife." In other

words, he has discovered the problem of the relationship between literature and
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life-or art and reality-and because he is seeing it for the first time he assumes

that it is new or "modern." Thus in his brief discussion of Gelber's Connection,
which Kampf takes as a seminal work, we find that the modern play is working
in much the same problematic way in relation to its own modality (the tensions
between stage as world and world as stage) as Shakespeare's plays. Kampf admits

that" plays have always done this sort of thing in some manner," but he still
would have us think that before modernism (whenever that was) all art stayed
on the stage, within the frame, in the cage of the past, quietly performing its
"traditional imitation of reality to delight and teach," pretending to a "finality"
that we modems know with our "speculative freedom" is impossible:
The traditional drama's main task is to order experience, to make sense
of the events taking place on the stage and thereby leave the audience
with an awareness of life's orderliness, whether that order be comic
or tragic.

In this statement Mr. Kampf would subsume a great deal of drama under the
narrow spirit that led Nahum Tate to rewrite the ending of King Lear,
mistakenly attributing a secure sense of "life's orderliness" to writers who
wished desperately for such an awareness but hardly ever felt sure that they
had found it. Frye's expression, in The Anatomy of Criticism., seems much closer
to the truth in its awareness of the motivation behind the literary act:
. • • the archetypal function of literature is visualising the world of
desire, not as an escape from "reality" but as the genuine form of the
world that human life tries to imitate.
A play is reality seen as manifest artifice. It does not" connect" with conventional
reality in the naive way which led Quixote to leap on the_ puppet stage, or
Pirandello's six characters to want to be the play. Such confusion reflects
the problematic nature of life, rather than the artificiality of art. The fact that
" real" people are actors and that life is a stage, means that actors, and the
stage, can be an expression of the theatrical or formal nature of reality as it is
grounded in invented roles and attitudes. This is the paradox of the playas
the most artificial-and therefore the most real-of media. The fact that Kampf
sat down expecting "actors" and then discovered "real addicts . . . hired to
act in the play" comes from his not knowing this, and from his-and the play's
-exaggeration of the paradox found in all good drama. What Kampf takes as
an eruption into reality is ultimately a purely artistic convention, li1{e those he
relegates to the formal theatre. Writers like Vergil, Chaucer, Shakespeare,
Fielding, Blake, Stendhal, Melville, Joyce, Woolf and Faulkner-to name a fewha.ve tried to teach us that it is mainly by calling attention to the artifice in their
work that they can succeed in capturing something of the significant reality they
seek. The film, too, in its most striking development, calls attention to itself as a
magical strip of celluloid, capable of much more important things than conventional realism.
This is perhaps the basic theoretical flaw of Kampf's very simple-minded book.
He buys the convention of "reality" and its separation from (pre-modern)
"art," and calls that good which he thinks combines the two. But art is possible
only when life is possible, and in the same ways; not when we escape from
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form completely, but, when we find an "authentic" form which we can
recognize as human experience. The stage, the frame, and such trappings are
important not because of the differences between the two realms, but because
of the similarities. They reflect the attempt to achieve a different consciousness
of the same reality. The frame calls attention to the world within as the" real"
world seen in a different way; confusions and uncertainties are not purged, but
beheld with a clarity not always possible in raw experience outside the frame.
Hopefully when we turn from the stage to the "real" world, we do so with
improved powers of "beholding." It is that possibility which makes aft signifiCartt, as it is the necessary return to Naples (and our return to our own lives)
which will prove the true significance of Shakespeare's Tempest.
To confirm that Kampf's mistake is this confusion of the medium itself for
the continuum of reality, and his urging us to jump on stage with the puppets,
let us observe him in a few acts of interpretation. In Chapter 1 we see his
initiation, prompted by the" emotional power" of The Connection:
The first time I attended a performance, one of the characters pursued
me into the men's room itself in order to beg for a handout. I had
no doubt that I would be approached by a peddler any moment.
In Chapter 3 we share his appreciation of Bernini's Saint Teresa in Ecstasy
(represented in the book by a small, unacknowledged black and white photo~
graph) :
To begin, there is the incredible life-like quality of Teresa's face . . . .
and we can almost hear her moan ... Bernini has managed to work his
stone into the most sensuous representation of orgasm I know. The
beholder, especially if he happens to be male, is quite naturally aroused;
in spite of himself, he becomes indecorously involved with what is going
on under the drapery; bluntly, he may picture himself as the cause of
orgasm.
At the end of that chapter, he frees us from" our intellectual bureaucrats" by
pointing out that we cannot appreciate the "beautiful lines" in Wordsworth's
boat-stealing episode (Prelude, Blr. 1) unless we "see that a rower faces the area
he leaves behind, and that a peak which is initially hidden behind a ridge gets
bigger and bigger as one draws away from it." Kampf's students and "most
critics" have "refused to see reality" in this scene, connecting it instead to
"some fantasy in their own minds-preferably sexuaL" One knows more
clearly, after reading this, what Blake was attacking in his Vision of the Last
Judgment:
Mental Things are alone Real; what is call'd Corporeal, Nobody Knows
Qf its Dwelling Place: it is in Fallacy, and its Existence an Imposture.
Where is the Existence Out of !Vlind or Thought? Where is it but in
the Mind of a Fool?
In Chapter 4 we learn that Milton got stuck in the pastoral, a bad genre, and
in Christianity which "attempts to fob off poverty as the most desirable of
all states." We also learn that Kampf has read Empson, and that some lines
from Marvell "are gorgeous beyond belief: They rape our wills." But the
highest praise of all must wait until Chapter 5, where Kampf discusses Freud:
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For example, Freud's derivation of Dora's dyspnea from her fantasy
of sucking a penis is surely one of our supreme illustrations of Coleridge's
concept of the imagination as the mind's unifying principle. . . .
Finally, in an almost sublime flight of imagination, Freud concludes that
Dora, at age fourteen, must have felt her friend Mr. K's erection when
he suddenly embraced her in a hallway.
Also in this chapter "our social philosophers" are roundly criticized for
their concern "not with the objectives of our society . . . but with what
that society is." Apparently what is is crucial when considering art, which
must directly imitate or even usurp reality, but irrelevant to social philosophy
where what ought to be must govern.
Along the way, Mr. Kampf manages to ignore many of the significant writers
and thinkers of the past 175 years, in literature as well as in psychology and
philosophy. The vacant places are filled with condemnations of modern critics
and academics who have not found the true path of modernism:
But at the present time, our associations are generally based on the
pretense that our work has some relevance to the pursuit of truth.
And most of us are quite aware of this. It is reflected in the language
we use; We speak of "jazzy experiments," of "swinging analyses,"
but not true ones. We know that the research projects we spend weeks
"working up" and for which we receive sizable grants are rarely directed
toward general enlightenment; instead their objectives are likely to be
the furthering of the war effort or the enhancement of one's personal
status.

If Mr. Kampf is in fact among this despicable group of status-seekers (as his
syntax suggests), we must welcome his resignation from the club and his plea
that others do so too. One can only wish that his admirable moral sense
(" without freedom we are less than human") were supported by more insight
and knowledge, and presented with more. skill and less arrogance.
THOMAS VOGLER

University of California, Santa Cruz

Music, The Arts, and Ideas: Patterns and Predictions in Twentieth-Century
Culture by Leonard B. Meyer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.
Pp. xi + 342. $7.95.
Professor Meyer ranges over a wide territory, confronting many aesthetic
problems and speculating freely. Sub-titled "Patterns and Predictions in
Twentieth-Century Culture," his book is divided into three parts: Prelude:
As It Has Been, comprising essays published in various journals between 1957
and 1963; As It Is, and Perhaps fVill Be, in which he explores the hypothesis
that forms the central core of his book; and F o17nalism in iYfusic: Queries and
Reservations.
The concerns of the book, despite its loose organization, have common
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relevance derived from the author's investigations of music: its morphology, its
varieties, its function in human discourse. But if it is not an embarrassment of
riches the book is nevertheless too heterogeneous in content to permit easy
generalizations about it. Meyer himself is not afraid of sweeping generalizations
or bold classifications. In fact, his tendency to indulge in these sometimes results
in untenable positions, as a similar proclivity did for Curt Sachs in The
Commonwealth of Art, because the uniqueness of particular art works is badly
served by superficial labels. Here, as in his Emotion and Meaning in Music,
Meyer's categories over-simplify and are often destructive of nuance.
Yet his chief argument is a cogent one. Meyer maintains that works of our
O'Wll time will not coalesce in one dominant art style, as we have been con~
ditioned to expect through examples of the last few centuries, but that instead a
great many kinds of art will continue to exhibit vitality, and even flourish, side
by side, in "fluctuating stasis." For historical precedent, Meyer points to
ancient Egypt, where a cultural "steady state," favorable to art but without
radical innovation endured for millenia.
There is, indeed, evidence that such a condition of fluctuating equilibrium
exists now in mid~twencieth century culture, and Meyer reminds us of myriad
styles that already meet the eye and assail the ear: testimony to what Susanne
Langer has called "the madhouse of too much art." Meyer's expectation of
continued co-existence for these and other varieties of art is plausible and is an
expectation I share. He thinks that further experiment will follow avenues already
opened up and that radical novelty in the media of art can hardly be expected
after what has transpired in recent years. Since I feel that certain It outer limits"
have been reached, in practical human terms, I am inclined to agree. I also
agree that the nineteenth century notion of progress according to which works
of art become ever" better" than their predecessors is invalid, though I thought
this ghost had been exorcised long ago.
But the more sophisticated awareness that studies in cultural anthropology and
comparative arts have brought about do not invalidate, as Meyer seems to believe,
all teleological theory. He assumes there is a new, "scientific" ideology, already
normative, characterized by "ahistoncal [sic J constructivism and objective impersonality." But the claims (even the avowed passion) of artists for anonymity are
largely spurious; BouIez and Stockhausen, who make such claims, immediately
come to mind. Meyer's quotation from T. S. Eliot (" Poetry is not a truning
loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the expression of
personality, but an escape from personality.") is bady chosen. Meyer speaks of
"avowed and explicit formalists such as Eliot and Stravinsky," disregarding the
pronounced strain of romanticism in both artists, to which their use of exotic
devices (and with Eliot, "radical juxtapositions"), no less than their expressive
elements, bear witness. Four Quartets, whatever Eliot may say, stands as one of
the most romantic poems in English literature.
Meyer makes the mistake of assuming that these artists are telling (or know)
the truth about themselves and their works. It is well to remember, wid) Eliot,
that one of his articulate disclaimers may be yet another yearning tribute to
traditional restraint if not a flagrant manifestation of modesty or even "good
manners." That special public to whom artists address themselves seems to know
better: its interest in individual idiosyncrasies of art and artist appears as great
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as ever and should chasten the gullibility of scholars. One cannot forget that a
composer as personal as Brahms was long characterized by many critics in tenus
which have been revived and put to hard use in recent years: "objectivist,"
II formalist," and so on.
Yet the romantic spirit, if Brahms lacks it, cannot be
found anywhere.
Meyer appears to interpret teleology in a narrow sense, as limited to necessary
and restricted ends. Yet his concept of fluctuating stasis itself can be regarded as
the result of multiple impulses toward order. Of nature, Meyer states: U It is
not about anything. It has no "content "; nor has it any goal or purpose." How
does he know? And what limits is he setting to nature? Why is not art, like the
human being, a n product" of nature? And why would the work of John Cage
(an example of transcendental particularism in Meyer's lexicon) be any closer to
nature than Beethoven's? Is <l fragmentation n more "real n than continuity or
purpose?
These questions not only remain after a reading of Meyerj they burn. Meyer
appears to revere" science": but his sacred cow is secular and thin. He reads
Ernest Nagel but not Edmund Sinnott. He assumes a It non-teleological" unanimity among scientists for which there is little evidence. But he stimulates;
indeed, I found myself taking issue with the author on almost every page, as
he disposed of immortality, biological purpose, and ESP. Meyer anticipated
this reaction, even welcomed it: a disarming invitation which need not, however,
render the critic impotent.
But I liked the book; it is the work of a lively and original intelligence. The
range of Meyer's thought has increased enonnously in the decade since Emotion
and Meaning in Music appeared, and his gains in clarity and readability are
equally impressive. The concluding essays, under Formalism in Music, are among
the most penetrating (and sometimes devastating) analyses of contemporary
composition I have seen. In "The Perception and Cognition of Complex Music"
he states: "It is well to remember that music is directed, not to the senses, but
through the senses and to the mind. And it might be well if more serious
attention were paid to the capacity, behavior, and abilities of the human mind."
This redeems all else. Meyer discerns hierarchies. He relates pattern to
function. He is a congenital teleologist.
GoRDON EpPERSON

University of Arizona

The Fiction of Nathanael West by Randall Reid. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1967. Pp. viii + 174. $4.50.
Parkinson's Law has evidently invaded library space-how else explain the
publication of this book? Mr. Reid is properly pious, but an article here, a note
there, would have served and might have saved him from straying beside the
point. For instance, he exhumes some sources and analogues of Miss Lonelyhearts:
Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Huysmans, Aldous Huxley, T. S. Eliot, Ensor, William
James, and Dostoyevsky. But every time he names a name, he names a critic
who named it first. So Mr. Reid pokes at the chaff a little and passes orr.
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Entomological criticism, as Melville called it. "He took his structure, and the
psychology which underlies the structure [of Miss LonelyheartsJ, intact from
Crime and Punishment." Ten pages of parallels, near parallels, and deliberate
inversions follow until one can only exclaim with the Frenchman who reprimanded a similar wrongheadedness: "Oui, oui, oui; c'est-a-dire, non." MISS
LONELYHEARTS IS AN AMERICAN BOOK, not a Russian. If you want to
understand its anti-hero, don't start with Raskolnikov (Russian pseudo-Napoleon)
but with Pierre Glendinning (American pseudo-Christ). If you wish to understand feature editor Shrike as the dead god, votary of the deadpan, you might
begin with Thoreau-in whose pantheon" Pan still reigns in his pristine glory "and end with Dr. Eckleburg, eyeless overseer. If you care to understand Miss
Lonelyhearts' entrapment between Betty (would-be wife) and Fay Doyle (seamoaning Terrible Mother)-the typical American predicament-read no further
than Moby-Dick; and if Mr. Reid had, he would never have supposed that the
"essential irrelevance [of the' homosexual interpretation to any important aspect
of the novel 'J can easily be demonstrated." Holding hands with Peter Doylethat was the name of \Vhitman's boyfriend, wasn't it?-is as important to .Miss
Lonelyhearts as it is to Ishmael who is similarly riven between the values of
"the wife, the hearth" and the great maternal sea and whale, who marries
Queequeg in compromise, and who holds hands with his mates as they squeeze
sperm.
There al'e all sorts of critical possibilities. \Vhy, for instance, is Miss Lonelyhearts a journalist, an adman for Christ, not a cleric? The answer lies in the
secularization of the Transcendental ethos, and one might read A Hazard of
New Fortunes for an early instance of the adman-editor's symbolic role in the
maintenance of the social order. If the agony column may be a source of pleasure,
then the funny page may be a source of pain. West thought of subtitling Miss
Lonelyhearts "A novel in the form of a comic strip," and Mr. Reid righrly
observes West's imitation of various pictorial techniques. But the painter he
does not mention whose comic strip manner is far more pertinent than de Chirico
and Grosz is Ben Shahn. Miss Lonelyhearts was published in 1933; in 1932
Shahn exhibited his comic strip-like series on Sacco and Vanzetti. Whether West
saw these paintings we cannot say, but we recognize in them a cognate spirit, the
heart of Miss Lonelyhearts: viciousness, compassion, suffering, irony, horror,
wit, innocence.
These characteristics are pitched to madness in West's last novel, The Day of
the Locust (1939), whose protagonist is a painter. Mr. Reid emphasizes West's
theatrical metaphors, the manner of his artifice and parody, but misses the point
of Tod Hackett's profession. Renouncing Winslow Homer and "Thomas
Ryder" (West's portmanteau error for Thomas Eakins and Albert Ryder),
renouncing Goya, Daumier, and Hogarth, Hackett takes refuge in certain seventeenth and eighteenth century Italians, Rosa, Guardi, Magnasco. He has
begun to paint The Burning of Los Angeles.
Across the top, parallel with the frame, he had drawn the burning city,
a great bonfire of architectural styles, ranging from Egyptian to Cape
Cod colonial. Through the center, winding from left to right, was a
long hill street and down it, spilling into the middle foreground, came
the mob carrying baseball bats and torches. For the faces of its members,
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he was using the innumerable sketches he had made of the people who
come to Califor:nia to die; the cultists of all sorts economic as well as
r.eligiolls, the wave, airplane, funeral and previe~ watchers-all those
poor devils who can only be stirred by the promise of miracles and then
only to violence.
Why this reactionary history painting-inconceivable after Guernica.? '\Vhy thi.;;
decadent appreciation of third-rate artists-not even Puanesi? Miss Lonelyhearts
is decent and sensitive, but Tad Hackett is decent and mediocre, a hack. Human
diminishment, like the dehumanization of love and religion, is central to West's
progress. In Tbe Day of tbe Locust only the vicious dwarf loves-he puts the
wounded head of his cock into his mouth; and only the rampaging mob
worships, a scene of terror which prefigures the race riot at the end of
Invisible Man. Sexual frustration and religious despair lead to political apocalypse.
A Cool Million (1934) describes the triumph of American fascism. It is, to
be sure, the least of West's three novels-at his best, West hurts us as he amuses;
here he just amuses-but it is incontestably superior to Tbe Dream Life of Balsa
Snell (1931), West's schoolboyish novella. Which makes it all the more
disproportionate that Ml'. Reid should devote a long exegesis to the slightest text
and leave A Cool Million virtually unexplored. Lemuel Pitkin, American
schlemiel, is as methodically dismembered as Yossarian's squadron, but poor
Pitkin hasn't finally a chance to jump. Instead he becomes a martyr to Shagpokc
Whipple's totalitarian cause, Shagpoke who sounds like W. C. Fields and who
raises the flag every day like Barry Goldwater. Needless to say, it is a cause
oUT dim young man does not understand in life, though in death he is as effectively misrepresented by the orator as that other martyr Billy Budd is by the
journalist. Christ will save us in eternity, but Claggart and Whipple triumph in
time. Melville's last bitter joke-the power of blackness edged with a divine
comedy-is West's point of departure.
In Miss Lonelyhearts West had written: "Man has a tropism for order. . . .
The physical world has a tropism for disorder, entropy." In the charge of
his divine madness Miss Lonelyhearts would embrace Peter Doyle and make the
cripple whole. He is shot accidentally for his effort. In A Cool Million Lemuel
Pitkin begins his final speech on behalf of political order: "I am a clown . . .
but there are times when even clowns must grow serious. This is such a time.
I .... " Then he is shot by an assassin. Yet it is one thing to be overcome by
entropy, another to yield to it. At the end of The Day of the Locust, in the
nightmare of converging mobs, West defines civil insurrection as entropy in the
social order; and when Tod begins to imitate the police siren, madness as entropy
in the psychic order.
The siren began to scream and at first he thought he was making the
noise himself. He felt his lips with his hands. They were clamped
tight. He knew then it was the siren. For some reason this made him
laugh and he began to imitate the siren as loud as he could.
Tod yields, and therein lies the true prophetic horror of The Day of the Locust.
Balsa's dream becomes the littered shopwindow of Miss Lonelyhearts, becomes
the garish museum of A Cool Million, becomes Los Angeles, the surreal city of
Tad's painting. Civilization burns as if it were so many Hollywood stage sets.
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Fanaticism as entropy in the cultural order. The key to West's art, synopsized
in the deepening and darkening of his moral vision, depends finally npon this
reintegration of formal experience. In this he is like the greatest of American
surrealists Arshile Gorky, not like de Chirico or Dali who run out of art when
they run out of dreams.
MARTIN POPS
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Byron and tbe Ruins of Paradise by Robert F. Gleckner. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press. Pp. xxiv + 365. $8.95.
In the lengthiest book yet devoted to the criticism of Byron's poetry, Gleclmer
eschews both the approach through biography and the approach through literary
history and convention. He sets out rather to prove that from first to last
Byron's poetry provides a "remarkably coherent II and "surprisingly consistent II
vision of the human condition-a vision so bleak it makes that of Beddoes or
" BV" Thomson seem positively cheerful by comparison. Man is born into an
"Eden" which never exists" except in man's mind"; his Fall is "the paradoxically
providential act of a God who punishes as evidence of his love"; and finally,
not only does man's" evil and perversion perpetuate his own wretchedness," but
his" , innate tendency to the love of Good' ..• also leads, paradoxically, to death
and destruction" (xviii, xix). Man is indeed damned if he does and damned if
he doesn't, and furthermore, he is not damned through original sin, or any
other kind of sin" (12), and he is damned by a loving God.
To prove a consistent vision of any kind in the works of a poet who prided
himself on his fidelity to fact and who wrote "if a writer should be quite consistent, / How could he possibly show things existent?" is not an easy task.
Glcckner sets about it first by rigorously discounting ahnoS! all that is cheerful
in the letters and poetry. Second, he makes use of a dialectical method of
keeping the reader off balance: no sooner does one feel oneself on the solid
ground of a definite terminology than it splits beneath one's feet into another
pair of contraries, either one of which, II paradoxically," is likely to tum
into the other.
So we :find that from the first the "public-private voice" of the letters,
",,-hich is often flip and good-humored, is "self-conscious" and ultimately
"unrevealing "j the" private-public voice" of the melancholy poems, on the other
hand, behind the various personae, reveals the "essential" Byron. (The terms
arc by his own admission awkward; by pp. 306-7 he seems to have confused them
himself.) In Englisb Bards, on the other hand, we find "a willful burying of
his essential self in a role that is more protective than natural," that "veils
his essential nature" (27). The "essential nature" of the most Protean poet
in English, unfortunately, is rather like the Kantian Ding an sicb: it constantly eludes the categories of the human understanding. Certainly there are
plenty of paradisiacal ruins, personal and public, in Byron's early poetry, but
such ruins had of course been a cliche in English poetry for half a century
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before Byron was born. In any case, it is a bit hard to take a man at his word
only when he is in bad humor.
This ploy, however, enables Gleckner to take the early poems very seriously
indeed-far more seriously than Byron took them himself, in his letters and
conversations. One does not reach Cbilde Harold III until p. 225 j 48 pages
are devoted to The Giaour and The Bride of Abydos, 14 to all of the later
dramas, from Marino Faliera and Sardanapalus to Cain. There is much sensible
criticism here, but comparatively little is concerned with the actual texture
or technique of the verse, and in spite of Gleclmer's generous quotations (or
perhaps ,because of them), one still doubts that this early and in most respects
conventional verse warrants or rewards such extensive treatment. Much of the
criticism is concerned to prove that the b~wildering shifts in voice or personae
(especially in such poems as The Giaour and Childe Harold I and II), which
most readers have taken to be confused, are actually purposeful, even deliberate.
But most goes to demonstrate the persistence of Byron's pessimistic "vision."
It is in this connection, for instance, that Tbe Bride of Abydos proves to
be "Byron's Hamlet," and Byron's "seriousness of purpose" in the poem is
attested by the fact that the borrowings from Hamlet are conscious and
deliberate. All one can say of tIus, I suppose, is tIlat perhaps they are, but
one would rather they were not (they seem to me more mechanical than
material). This is not to say that these verse romances are not worth reading:
for the general reader, as Eliot remarked, they have the cardinal virtue of
never being dull; for the scholar, they present an aspect of Romanticism of great
historical importance. Nevertheless the apparent effrontery of such comparisons
surely does the cause more harm than good.
In the long run, however, it is probably Glec1mer's paradoxical dialectic
which will have the more lasting effect on Byron criticism. Shorn of its
fashionable theological overtones-especially of that loving G';od Who punishes
man for sins neither original nor committed, and Who causes man to fall from
a paradise which never in fact existed (indeed, Glec1mer also drops Him rather
early: on p. 122 we find that the Fall has" little or nothing to do with God")
-Gleckner's Byronic vision is not so very novel. A good many critics have
insisted on the existentialist or H absurd" nature of the Byronic universe-i. c.,
on the quite un-Romantic absence of absolute values, metaphysical or ethical,
and of any significant destiny in history and in the world at large. Most
critics, however, have pointed also to Byron's persistent faith in the mind of
individual man: not only in its capacity to endure, as in Manfred, but also to
create and even to enjoy what in Don Juan is called" Life's infinite variety."
Precisely at this point, however, Gleckner impales man on the tines of another
ineluctable dichotomy: that between head and heart, mind and feeling. This
hoary pair of contraries has of course done yeoman service in the criticism
of a great deal of Romantic literature, but its inappropriateness for Byron, the
one Romantic poet who retained a deep respect for Reason, seems to me evident
in the drastic shifts in meaning which these terms must undergo in the course
of Glec1mer's critique. The heroes of the verse romances, for instance, must
stand for masculine and "destructive" mind, and the docile heroines for love
and tenderness. Yet if one were searching for a word to characterize the Giaour,
Conrad, and Lara, "mind" would not, I think, be the inevitable choice: self-
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control, perhaps, but in the services of quite irrational passions for honor and
loyalty, or vengeance. The" unconquerable" and even creative mind in which
the later Childe Harold or Manfred take ,olace is ,urely different in kind; and
both types of mind bear little relationship to that free and humane play of
the skeptical intellect which characterizes the narrator of Don Juan.
But mind and heart are in Gleckner's dialectic vision irreconcilable: compassion can only lead to despair, and the escapes or solutions which the mind
proposes must finally" dehumanize." It is for this reason that Gleckner finds
even Don Juan an "ultimately depressing fable for our times." "The structure
of the poem," he writes, II is built solidly on the thesis and antithesis of the
poet's emotional and rational responses to the world. He is constantly being tom
by his heart's involvement and restored by his cooler, dispassionate judgment;
and both of these dynamic movements cohere in the consistent vision of the
universe as a vast sea of desolation and ruin" (124, 337-8). Surely this is an
instance of the Fallacy of Misplaced Contraries: compassion need not be
mindless, nor need the mind inevitably II dehwnaruze." But if the message of
Don Juan is that man's hope for salvation consists precisely in an honest and
reasoning compassion, then Byron's vision is neither so paradoxical nor so
desperate as Gleckner would have one believe.
Some of Byron's poetry does deserve the attention which Gleckner gives it,
but one wishes that he had spent more time in intelligent general criticismas in his chapter on the themes and "image clusters" in Chi/de Harold IVand had not '0 hung up his study on a thesis which seems no very ,olid peg.
On the whole he has been quite just and generous with his predecessors. In
the matter of his mind-heart, masculine-feminine contraries, however, he twice
cites D. H. Lawrence, but not in this regard G. Wilson Knight, who I believe
deserves credit for a rather more subtly-conceived dichotomy than Gleckner's
proves to be.
PETER L. THORSLEV, JR.
University of California, Los Angeles
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